Spain’s anti-corruption plan hits the constitutional buffers

A point often lost on outside observers is that inefficient governance is sometimes seen as an acceptable cost of preserving Spain’s constitutional balance. This is particularly true in the case of anti-corruption reform efforts—and after a bruising few months of scandals, a number of proposals have suddenly appeared on the table.

In mid-June, the Cerdán corruption scandal erupted, threatening to bring down Pedro Sánchez’s coalition government. In desperation, the OECD was called in, and within a matter of weeks, Spain published a national anti-corruption plan with 15 concrete measures across five pillars.

There are some solid reforms in the plan, such as the long-overdue move toward including beneficial ownership information in Spain’s business register and a revamped public procurement portal.

But other reforms are less convincing—particularly the proposal to establish a new central, independent Public Integrity Agency. This initiative looks set to fail.

The regions—especially Catalonia, where most of Spain’s public procurement takes place—will resist any initiative that shifts powers, or even gives the impression of doing so, back to Madrid. Yet, as the plan acknowledges, the current regionalised framework “creates asymmetries in institutional capacity” and “weakens the State’s collective response to systemic risks.”

To work in practice, the new Public Integrity Agency will have to confront these risks and trade-offs head-on. But at present, the plan is unclear on whether the agency will be set up as a central coordinating body with some investigative powers, or whether it will conduct serious investigations under its own steam. So far, no launch date or further detail has been provided—and so expectations should be tempered.